If this is you You helped win a protection at work, and years later you're still the one keeping it alive.

The Right to Get Tired

Every protection keeps someone exceptional: the informed consumer comparing plans at eleven at night, the daughter on hold all afternoon. Ask who has to stay that way.

The argument in 8 lines
If this is you
You helped win a protection at work, and years later you're still the one keeping it alive.
The claim
No good arrangement can depend indefinitely on exceptional conduct, so a protection has to survive its members getting tired, withdrawing and being replaced.
The mechanism
Correction runs on the people errors landed on, so the wronged supply the institution's improvement unpaid, and those who win a protection keep paying to maintain it.
Who pays
The people who won a protection and its most committed members, paying in attention, evenings and the willingness to be difficult.
Who can correct it
Paid watchers who answer to the institution they watch learn what it can afford to hear, so the people a protection serves need the power to replace them.
Whose call it was
An arrangement's claim on its members' hours is limited: the more people depend on it, the more it owes them, faster than any right to command them.
What would change it
Make maintenance work bounded, rotated, replaceable and paid, with a shift end, and have each protection state the hours it consumes, from whom, and what happens when they stop.
The objection it answers
A fairer division of vigilance looks like the remedy. Even a perfect division leaves a total that may exceed what people have to give, so some burdens have to be designed out.
Reading settings

The question up top, the outline, the instrument and the what-next. Turn it off and you just get the essay.

A battery. A rope pulls tight between it and the person. A loop brings them back to where they began.

A union member comes to the meeting straight from their shift. Their local won a staffing ratio, and they’re the one who keeps checking that it’s met. When the committee seat comes up again this year, they take it, because nobody else will.

Every political theory keeps an ideal citizen somewhere in the building. The republic needs the virtuous one, the market the informed one, the deliberative democracy the one who reads the consultation document, the movement the one who comes to the meeting after the shift. The theory rarely says it needs them, but the need shows when they’re absent. In practice the informed consumer turns out to be a person comparing insurance plans at eleven at night. The engaged citizen is a daughter who has already spent the afternoon on hold. When the organizer who held the local together moves away, the local folds. Seen from underneath, the theory’s conditions of success are a job description. The job is unposted, unpaid, and filled by whoever is nearest to qualifying for it.

The right to get tired.

What no design changes

Some things stay true whatever the design, and each turns a hope about people into a question about institutions. Human imperfection is permanent. People will be tired, distracted, wrong, selfish on Tuesdays and generous on Thursdays, and a good arrangement can’t change any of that. So no socially desirable arrangement can depend indefinitely on exceptional conduct. The design has to hold when the conduct is ordinary.

Institutional imperfection is permanent. Rules compress the world they govern, and the compression is always wrong somewhere. Getting the initial rules right cannot substitute for keeping correction, contestation and recourse alive.

Disagreement is permanent. Interests compete, and no program of education or moral development will retire the competition. So governance has to run on people who don’t agree and aren’t going to.

Human life is finite, and that turns the other three into a bill. Maintaining correction takes hours. Contesting takes hours. Organizing against a disagreement that will never end takes hours. Those hours come out of lives with a fixed number of them. Who spends them is a distributive question of the same rank as who owns what and who bends when the rule meets the world.

Those bills rest on a distinction between a politics that tries to produce better people and one that changes the conditions under which imperfect people live together. Only the second can survive its own members. A politics of better people treats improvement as a precondition of membership: you are protected once you are the kind of person the arrangement was built for. A politics of conditions treats it as a bonus. People can become more capable, more conscientious, more virtuous, and the arrangement takes the gift without having required it.

The maintenance ledger

One burden is familiar: the remainder a rule leaves when it meets a case it can’t hold, and the person who absorbs the remainder so the rule can go on calling itself adequate. A second burden runs alongside the first and is easy to mistake for it. The maintenance ledger records what it takes to keep the corrective arrangements alive. Its entries are the complaint that has to be filed, the pattern that has to be documented before anyone will believe it is a pattern, and the appeal that has to be traversed. Then come the meeting that has to be attended, the union that has to be kept from lapsing, and the committee seat that has to be filled again this year because nobody else will.

Standing turns an experienced residual into admissible evidence. Appeal, review, complaint and organized refusal are the channels of consequential contradiction that keep power corrigible, and all four are labor. An institution’s ability to learn from its errors runs on the people who catch them. When those people are the ones the errors landed on, the correction mechanism has the same shape as the defect. The institution improves, and the person who was wronged supplies the improvement, unpaid, on top of having been wronged. Sara Ahmed’s study of complaint drew on testimony from academics and students who complained at universities. It found the same shape: the procedure exists, and the complainant pays much of its cost in time and effort.1

Correction that depends on the vigilance of the affected is a burden transfer with a grievance procedure attached.

Rented protections

A stranger entry appears on the winning side. A movement wins something and writes the protection down: a staffing ratio, a right of appeal, a bargaining unit, a rule that the algorithm may be contested. The protection then has to be kept. Someone monitors the ratio. Someone brings the test case that keeps the appeal right from becoming ceremonial, and runs for the position that keeps the unit certified. The people who do this are, with remarkable consistency, the people who won the protection, because they’re the ones who know what it cost and what it was for.

Keeping the gain costs something, and the cost is paid in the same currency as the struggle: attention, evenings, the willingness to be the difficult one at the meeting.2 Oscar Wilde’s remark that socialism would take too many evenings struck Michael Walzer as one of the most significant criticisms ever made of socialist theory. A protection that exists only while someone works to keep it is rented rather than owned. The rent is due monthly, and the tenant can’t stop paying because everyone else’s tenancy runs through the same payment. Iris Marion Young argued that responsibility for structural injustice is shared by everyone connected to the structure.3 In the maintenance ledger, the shared responsibility is discharged by the same dozen people, until they cannot.

Here emancipatory politics reproduces the arrangement it opposed. The institution ran on the adaptability of its least powerful members and called their endurance consent. The movement against it runs on the vigilance of its most committed members and calls their exhaustion dedication. When a liberation has to be maintained by heroic conduct from the people it liberated, it has changed who the crumple zone protects, and there’s still a crumple zone.

Can an arrangement’s members get tired?

An arrangement can be put to a test drawn from the ledger. Can its members get tired, make mistakes, withdraw from organizing, pursue interests that have nothing to do with it, and eventually be replaced? Can they do all that without making everyone else’s rights and security precarious?

The test moves the definition of freedom. An institutional arrangement changes the conditions of freedom when it removes a burden. The arrangement changes them again, by the same amount, when it changes what people have to keep doing to preserve the removal. When the remedy costs more than the harm, the right is a paper right. If a right’s continued existence costs someone their evenings, the right carries a standing maintenance charge, and the person paying it isn’t free in the sense the right was supposed to secure.

Non-domination, on Philip Pettit’s account, is the absence of exposure to uncontrolled power.4 It has mostly been treated as a stock, something a person has or lacks, but the maintenance ledger shows it as a flow. The protection is there this year because it was worked for this year.

Albert Hirschman’s three options price this.5 Exit is available, and exit means losing the protection along with everything else. Voice is available, and voice is the maintenance work itself, in its most demanding form. Loyalty keeps the person from leaving after the organization has become destructive. In a collective arrangement, loyalty means knowing that you are free to leave and that, if you do, the appeal right lapses for the people behind you. That knowledge turns an available exit into an unusable one, and works hardest on exactly the people who could be relied on to stay.

Some burdens should be shared and others designed out

The obvious remedy is a fairer division. Joan Tronto’s caring democracy asks who has been allowed to evade the responsibilities others carry, and the answer is almost always worth acting on.6 But the maintenance ledger exposes a limit on redistribution. Even if the vigilance were divided perfectly, the total would still be a quantity, and the quantity might still be more than the people involved have to give. A committee might need forty volunteer hours a month to keep a protection alive. Finding forty people to give one hour each wouldn’t make it sustainable, because the arrangement would then need forty people to stay the kind of person who gives an hour, forever.

Some burdens should be shared and others designed out. The line between them follows the two meanings of maintenance: the maintenance that keeps people alive and the maintenance that keeps a system standing. A protection that needs the affected to keep proving the pattern is a system asking to be maintained. The design alternative is a protection that detects its own failure, an institution carrying the vigilance as a funded function rather than as an unstated expectation of its members. A funded function has its own way to fail. If the staff paid to keep watch answer to the institution they watch, they learn what it can afford to hear, and the vigilance has moved up a floor without getting any cheaper. The people the protection is for need the power to replace them. Before a rule runs, it should state who will carry the reconciling. A remedy owes the same kind of statement: how many hours per year does this protection consume, drawn from whom, and what’s in place when they stop?7

Elinor Ostrom found no durable commons that ran on nobody: arrangements that last are arrangements people participate in, monitor and sanction.8 The right to get tired can’t mean the right of everyone to do nothing at once. It means the work is bounded, rotated, replaceable and paid, and that the arrangement has a shift end. A duty with a shift end is compatible with ordinary lives. A duty with no end is conscription described as citizenship, and the people best at it are the first to break.

Hannah Arendt asked what’s left for action, for initiative that serves no further purpose, if politics becomes wholly the organization of necessity.9 The person who has to attend the meeting isn’t choosing to be there, so what they do already falls short of action in her sense. Freeing people from compulsory maintenance makes chosen participation possible, and a society that needs fewer heroes is the only kind in which heroism can be a decision.

An afternoon with no purpose

The institutional argument rests on a claim about what a person is owed, easy to state and hard to design for. A person should be allowed to have intense convictions without those convictions becoming the organizing principle of every hour. They should be allowed to care about domination and also to make a terrible joke, love their spouse, follow a band, and lose a Saturday to nothing. A politics of freedom can keep demanding morally exemplary conduct, permanent attention and evidence of socially beneficial activity from the people it freed. When it does, it has brought back from the inside the pressure it was supposed to remove. It has told them their afternoons are provisionally theirs, pending the next thing that needs holding together.

That leaves a question of quantity. How much of a person’s life is an arrangement entitled to consume in exchange for protecting them? The rule is that the more people depend on an institution, the more it owes them, and the debt grows faster than any right to command them. Applied to maintenance, the rule says the more an arrangement depends on its members’ vigilance to stay corrigible, the more it owes them a way to stop being vigilant. An institution that can’t survive its members’ ordinary lives has been staffed rather than built.

Notes

1

Sara Ahmed, Complaint! (Duke University Press, 2021).

2

Michael Walzer, “A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen,” Dissent, May–June 1968, which took Oscar Wilde’s remark that socialism would take too many evenings as one of the most significant criticisms ever made of socialist theory: a self-governing society needs citizens who will sit through its endless meetings.

3

Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford University Press, 2011).

4

Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

5

Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Harvard University Press, 1970).

6

Joan C. Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice (New York University Press, 2013).

7

The five lines a rule owes before it runs: The remainder statement.

8

Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

9

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958).

When they get you wrong or count on you

123
Who pays
The people who won a protection and its most committed members, paying in attention, evenings and the willingness to be difficult.
Who can change it
Paid watchers who answer to the institution they watch learn what it can afford to hear, so the people a protection serves need the power to replace them.
Whether it was theirs to decide
An arrangement's claim on its members' hours is limited: the more people depend on it, the more it owes them, faster than any right to command them.

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