If this is you You found a duplicate charge on your statement, and getting it back means proving the company's error to support.

Blameless Postmortems Should Cover Customers Too

Organizations have learned not to blame their own people for failures the system produced. They still leave customers to find the damage, prove it, and ask for it back.

A case file: the rule, the person it landed on, and who could correct it.

The argument in 8 lines
If this is you
You found a duplicate charge on your statement, and getting it back means proving the company's error to support.
The case
Ireland's communications regulator found many Eir customers overcharged without ever noticing. In a 2023 settlement Eir agreed to a €2.45 million penalty and to find and refund about 76,000 customers.
The claim
Organizations treat failures as the system's fault when staff are involved but leave customers to notice, prove and claim back the harm, so blamelessness stops at the payroll.
The mechanism
The incident closes once service is restored, refunds go only to customers who notice and ask, and the money from everyone else stays on the company's books.
Who pays
Customers with the least spare attention, working two jobs or caring for a parent, who never spot the charge and keep the loss.
Who can correct it
Nobody across engineering, support and finance owns the count of people harmed and not yet made whole, so nobody reports it.
What would change it
Find everyone affected from the same logs, refund them without a claim, and keep the incident open until the last one is paid, with someone outside checking the count.
The objection it answers
Finding every affected person costs more than repaying the ones who complain. The difference is exactly what the organization has been keeping, so calling it too expensive says the error was profitable.
Reading settings

The question up top, the outline, the instrument and the what-next. Turn it off and you just get the essay.

A maze. Its costs roll downhill onto the person. A loop brings them back to where they began.

A customer going through their card statement sees the subscription charged twice in the same month. They write in, and then they wait to get their money back.

A subscription company’s billing service charges some customers twice for a month. A deploy changed how retries were handled, a payment processor timed out on a busy afternoon, and for a few hours the retry logic treated a slow success as a failure and charged again.

The engineering response is exemplary. Someone spots the anomaly in a dashboard within a day. The team writes a postmortem that names no culprit, lays out the timeline, and traces the defect to a missing idempotency check and a review process with no way to catch it. There are action items with owners and due dates. The fix ships with a test. The engineer who merged the change is thanked for writing half the document. The organization fires nobody, because it has learned that firing the person who happened to be holding the pen teaches it nothing about the pen.

Then the incident is closed. The double charges are still sitting on thousands of card statements. Customers who notice and write in get a refund, usually quickly and with an apology. Customers who don’t notice keep the loss. Nobody went looking for them, although the same logs that told the engineers which requests were retried also say, to the row, which accounts were charged twice.

The same split turns up in a regulator’s file. When Ireland’s communications regulator investigated overcharging at Eir, it found customers who had spotted the error and won a refund, and was concerned that many more had been overcharged without ever noticing or disputing it. In a 2023 settlement Eir agreed to pay a €2.45 million penalty and to find and refund an estimated 76,000 customers, about €6.7 million in all.1

Blameless inside, billed outside

The blameless postmortem is one of the better things modern organizations have learned to do. Google’s site reliability engineers made it a published practice: a written account of an incident that assumes the people involved acted reasonably on what they knew, and asks what about the system let a reasonable action cause harm.2 John Allspaw’s account from Etsy made the same case, and Sidney Dekker’s work on just culture gave it a longer history in aviation and medicine.3 The logic is sound. People make errors because systems allow them to, and punishing the person leaves the system ready to produce the same error through someone else.

Organizations apply that logic on one side of the building. Inside, the organization treats the incident as a property of the system. Nobody has to prove they were not negligent; the organization carries the investigation and the fix. Outside, it treats the incident as a matter for each customer. The customer has to notice the charge, recognize it as an error rather than a price change, find the support channel, describe the problem in terms the agent will accept, and wait.

The organization protects an engineer from absorbing the failure personally. It requires a customer to absorb it personally, until they hand it back, so blamelessness stops at the payroll.

Responsibility should land where authority lived: the power to have altered the outcome, when it was still alterable. A blameless postmortem honors the rule inside the building. But an organization that has accepted, in writing, that its design caused the harm has also accepted the harm. Owning the cause and disowning the consequence is a strange combination, and the ordinary one.

As the Julie Thao case shows, refusing to scapegoat frontline staff is not the same as letting an institution off the hook. A blameless postmortem lifts blame off an individual and sets it on the design, and the design belongs to the organization. Blamelessness for workers protects reporting; blamelessness for the organization shields negligence. A claims process is how an organization that has cleared its staff arrives there: the harm its design caused becomes nobody’s, and whoever it landed on is left to prove it happened.

Why the line runs along the payroll

Part of the answer is bookkeeping. An incident, in most reliability practice, is a disruption to a service. It opens when the service degrades and closes when the service is restored and the follow-up work is tracked. Refunds belong to a different department with a different budget and a different measure of success. Engineering is judged on recurrence. Support is judged on handle time and satisfaction scores. Finance sees refunds as a cost to be forecast and, where possible, contained. No one across the three departments owns the number of people who were harmed and have not been made whole, so no one reports it.

Remediation is also designed as a claim. A refund that has to be requested is a refund most people will never receive, and nobody has to decide that for it to be true. The claim rate is a variable, and every point below one hundred percent is money that stays on the company’s books. The sorting happens in the gap between an error that occurred and an error that was noticed, and the customer is the only party assigned to close that gap.

Noticing is labor, unevenly distributed. The customer who reconciles every statement catches the double charge. The customer working two jobs, or caring for a parent, or whose card statement goes to an email address they check once a month, does not. A patient billed for a procedure that was covered, a claimant whose benefit was miscalculated, a tenant charged a fee the lease didn’t allow: in each case the institution’s error is corrected in proportion to the victim’s spare attention. The routing is the same one found wherever software runs cleanly because a person is soaking up the variance.

The claim process also changes what the error looks like from inside. A refund total drawn only from complainants is smaller than the harm, and when the organization later asks how bad the incident was, it reads that total and concludes: contained. The customers who never noticed are absent from every report, and a harm that appears in no report cannot shape the next decision about how much to spend preventing it.

Extending blamelessness past the payroll

Extending blamelessness past the payroll means applying the postmortem’s own premises to the people the failure reached. A customer who missed the double charge was doing what ordinary people do with a card statement. A system that relies on their noticing depends on exceptional conduct from people it has no right to conscript. If the organization would not accept “the engineer should have been more careful” as a root cause, it has no standing to accept “the customer should have checked their statement” as a remediation plan.

In practice, the organization identifies everyone affected, using the same data it used to diagnose the defect. In most billing, benefits and claims failures this is a query, and the engineers have usually already written it to size the incident.

It makes them whole without a claim: the refund goes back to the original payment method, the benefit is recalculated and paid, the wrong denial is reversed and the patient told. Interest or a fee reversal follows where the money was held long enough to cost the person something.

And the incident stays open until the external harm is repaired. The postmortem template gets one more required section: the number of people affected, the number made whole, and the date the last one was paid. An incident with unrepaired victims is an incident in progress, and belongs on the same dashboards and in the same review meetings as an unfixed defect.

An administrative stop on a failing system should hold until an independent review has found and fixed its cause. The equivalent rule for remediation is that the organization cannot declare the matter over while still holding what the defect took.

Some regulators already require something like this in particular sectors, directing firms to identify affected customers and pay redress without waiting for complaints.4 The principle underneath is general, and an organization can adopt it without waiting for a regulator, provided someone other than the organization checks the count. A make-whole the company administers and declares finished is the claim process under a kinder name.

The cost is the money kept

Finding and repaying every affected person does cost more than repaying the ones who complain. The difference is exactly the amount the organization has been keeping. An argument that proactive remediation is too expensive is an argument that the error was profitable.

Some affected people can’t be identified or reached, and for them the right response is a documented effort and an unclaimed balance that stays owed, rather than a quiet write-back to revenue. The existence of a hard residue is no reason to skip the easy majority.

An open offer would invite false claims, and proactive remediation makes no offer. The organization pays the accounts its own logs identify, and the logs are the one witness nobody can coach.

Closing the incident

A blameless postmortem is a promise that the organization will treat its failures as its own. Most organizations keep the promise to their staff and break it with everyone else, and the break is visible in a single field. Look at when the incident was marked resolved and then at when the last affected customer got their money back. In most organizations the second date doesn’t exist, because nobody was assigned to produce it, and the customers who never noticed are still paying for a defect the company fixed, documented and learned from.

Notes

1

Commission for Communications Regulation, “Eircom will refund customers for overcharging, pay ComReg a penalty of €2.45 million and make changes to its billing practices,” Information Notice ComReg 23/46, May 17, 2023, comreg.ie. The investigations covered June 2018 to March 2019 and September 2019 to September 2020. The refunds cover customers charged through a “broken bundle” on their accounts, customers whose requests to cancel were never processed, and customers charged early-cancellation fees they did not owe; Eircom, which trades as Eir, had been convicted of 26 overcharging offences in 2015, 2017 and 2018.

2

Betsy Beyer, Chris Jones, Jennifer Petoff and Niall Richard Murphy, eds., Site Reliability Engineering: How Google Runs Production Systems (O’Reilly, 2016), chapter 15, “Postmortem Culture: Learning from Failure.”

3

John Allspaw, “Blameless PostMortems and a Just Culture,” Code as Craft (Etsy engineering blog), May 2012; Sidney Dekker, Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability (Ashgate, 2007).

4

The UK Financial Conduct Authority’s Consumer Duty, PRIN 2A.2.5R (in force from 31 July 2023), applies when a firm identifies, “through complaints, its internal monitoring or from any other source,” that retail customers have suffered foreseeable harm from its acts or omissions. The firm must then act in good faith and take appropriate action to rectify the situation, including redress where appropriate. PRIN 2A.10 sets out what it must do when no complaint has been received.

When they get you wrong or count on you

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Who pays
Customers with the least spare attention, working two jobs or caring for a parent, who never spot the charge and keep the loss.
Who can change it
Nobody across engineering, support and finance owns the count of people harmed and not yet made whole, so nobody reports it.

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